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Abstract  
In recent years, the philosophical focus of the modeling literature has shifted from 
descriptions of general properties of models to an interest in different model functions. It has 
been argued that the diversity of models and their correspondingly different epistemic goals 
are important for developing intelligible scientific theories (Levins, 2006; Leonelli, 2007). 
However, more knowledge is needed on how a combination of different epistemic means can 
generate and stabilize new entities in science. This paper will draw on Rheinberger’s 
practice-oriented account of knowledge production. The conceptual repertoire of 
Rheinberger’s historical epistemology offers important insights for an analysis of the 
modelling practice. I illustrate this with a case study on network modeling in systems biology 
where engineering approaches are applied to the study of biological systems. I shall argue 
that the use of multiple means of representations is an essential part of the dynamic of 
knowledge generation. It is because of – rather than in spite of – the diversity of constraints 
of different models that the interlocking use of different epistemic means creates a potential 
for knowledge production.    
 
Keywords: modeling, reverse engineering, network motifs, Rheinberger, engineering 
analogies, historical epistemology.  
 
1. The role of models in knowledge generation 
This paper focuses on the use of models in scientific practice and reflects on knowledge 
generation through the integrative use of multiple models and epistemic frameworks. Despite 
the diversity of models - from mathematical representations to living model organisms - the 
categorization under the same name has relatively recently been justified by their common 
function as investigative instruments that mediate between theory and the world (Morgan & 
Morrison, 1999). The broad definition implies that anything that can be used as a facilitator 
of scientific reasoning through representation of target objects or of hypothetical systems may 
  
be called a model. However, models are involved in several complex relations, and there is 
no simple linear relation between target and representation. Of importance is not only the 
connection between models and their targets, but also the dynamic relations between different 
models. Rather than analyzing how models represent targets, I shall argue for the importance 
of understanding how and why models are combined in iterative processes. A 
characterization of the virtues of models that only takes into account how single models 
represent target objects, delineating success of a model with structural similarity, has the 
limitation that it cannot account for how scientists learn about the world with the use of 
highly idealised and unrealistic models. Instead, models may be more adequately described as 
epistemic tools; as artefacts constructed for the purpose of manipulation and specifically 
constrained by their representational means and use in a concrete scientific context 
(Knuuttila, 2011). I exemplify this with a case study on network modelling in systems 
biology where models are used in a spiral-like fashion to develop insights about organizing 
principles for biological networks.  
I focus on how models work at the intersection of the known and the unknown. When 
unmediated evidence for the features of a target phenomenon is not a possibility, models can 
establish connections between the known and the unknown (Rheinberger, 1997). Since 
models serve a variety of different epistemic goals in research and signify different 
representational means, a pragmatic account of models must take the variety of model 
functions into account (Leonelli, 2007). I propose that models are primarily informative from 
a relational perspective where they are connected to other models. The activity of modeling 
thus has an inherent systemic nature in being coupled to other models and entities, and the 
modeling activity should be seen in the context of how different models are brought together 
(see also Wimsatt, 1981; Weisberg, 2006; Winther, 2006; Knuuttila & Loettgers, 2011). The 
consequence of this view is that it is more important how models help us gain knowledge 
about an unknown target system through the relations to other representations.1  
In exploring the use of multiple models in systems biology I shall draw on the conceptual 
repertoire of Rheinberger’s historical epistemology where modeling is understood as the 
activity of “shuttling back and forth between different spaces of representation” 
(Rheinberger, 1997, p. 108). I provide an integrated account where modeling is understood as 
a matter of constructing, manipulating and comparing representations in a spiral-like fashion 
where a whole body of models interact. I first underline the aspects of Rheinberger’s 
conceptual framework that I find particularly useful for understanding modelling and its 
relationship to experimental practices. Section 2 addresses this issue with a case study from 
systems biology where a variety of models are used to reverse engineer a biological network 
in search for design principles. Section 3 examines how methods and models from 
engineering and biology are integrated and combined in order to gain knowledge about 
organizing principles. Finally, I relate the account of this paper to recent philosophical 
accounts and discuss what is gained by employing this framework for discussing the role of 
models.  
                                                            
1 The traditional representationist view defines representation in this narrow sense whereas I shall adopt a 
broader notion and specify different roles of models as representational means (see Knuuttila, 2011 for further 
clarification of the different notions of representation).  
 
  
 
1.1. A conceptual framework for understanding modeling 
Scientific reasoning is never as clear as it is expressed later when presented in published 
papers. During the process of knowledge generation the relevant representations are neither 
known nor readymade for comparison. When modelling is used for gaining knowledge about 
a (partly) unknown object the process is not an approximation to something already stable. 
New research objects are unstable in the sense that their properties and boundaries are neither 
known in advance nor directly accessible for observation. Because there is no direct 
representation of the yet unknown target the process of stabilizing a new entity happens 
indirectly through relations to different bodies of already certified knowledge and by 
production of new representations for comparison and integration. This process is often an 
iterative cycle of modelling and experimentation, where a series of representations with 
different constraints are combined. The constraining relations of epistemic tools are 
historically situated in what Rheinberger calls an experimental system (Rheinberger, 1997). 
With this notion Rheinberger captures Bachelard’s description of the instruments of modern 
science as “theories materialized”. The idea is that the technicalities of an experimental 
system productively constrain scientific reasoning by determining the realm of possible 
representations (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 20). His notion of experimental system is broad and 
includes instruments, models, and material and theoretical entities with varying degrees of 
scientific stability. Stability is here an indicator of how well the scientific objects, instruments 
or concepts are accepted by the scientific community and is thus an epistemic, rather than an 
ontological, category.  
The focus on stability is important for understanding the role of models in research since 
models occupy a middle position in the continuum between two types of objects that 
experimental systems consist of. These are differentiated by their different degrees of 
(epistemic) stability: 
 
1. Technical objects provide the stable context for experimentation. They can be 
material objects, concepts, systems of accepted knowledge, or instruments. 
Rheinberger defines technical objects as “answering machines”, since they work as 
unquestioned tools to produce answers about epistemic objects.  
2. Epistemic objects are unstable entities existing at the boundary between the known 
and the unknown. These can be physical structures or processes that are objects of 
investigation in a specific context at a particular time. Through the embodiment of 
what one “does not yet know”, epistemic objects thus work as “question generating 
machines” that drive science forward.   
Whereas technical objects set the boundary conditions for the possible representations 
within the experimental system, epistemic objects are only vaguely present in the context of a 
research project. They do not (yet) appear as stable scientific facts, methods or entities but are 
brought into existence within the context of an experimental system that embeds and 
constrains them. Knowledge production is spiral-like and takes the form of a continuous 
transformation of epistemic entities to technical entities, if they can become sufficiently 
  
stabilized through a process Rheinberger calls resonance (figure 1, resonance will be clarified 
below). In this process models play a key role because they are situated at the interface of 
technical and epistemic objects, or between the known and the unknown. On one hand, 
models must include sufficiently reliable and stable features to enable researchers to make 
sense of the comparison and re-production of representations. On the other hand, they 
produce new questions and thereby help to constitute objects of knowledge through the 
embodiment and production of what is not yet known (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 110).  
 
Figure 1, Knowledge generation: a self-correcting spiral of oscillations between representations. The 
ontogenesis of new technical objects goes from left to right as epistemic objects become sufficiently stabilized. 
But the production of epistemic entities goes from right to left as technical objects frame new epistemic entities. 
The epistemic stability and specific constraints of models depend on the historicity of the research contexts, the 
representational means and the epistemic goals inherent in the design and use of models.  
The activity of modeling has a systemic nature. One model never addresses all relevant 
features of the target phenomena; if so, the model would be almost as complex as the target 
itself and of no use as an epistemic tool. For Rheinberger, the notion of representation 
relevant for understanding the role of models has nothing to do with approximations in the 
sense of mirroring a target. Rather, representation is a matter of producing and reproducing 
traces for comparison and manipulation. He distinguishes between three types of 
representation that will be discussed in section 3. Because of the complexity of most target 
phenomena, models inform by being instances of specific idealisations and manipulations 
that must be integrated with other models in order to be informative. Without a firm 
epistemic foundation to build scientific knowledge on, the scientists must rely on how well 
representations with different constraints can be integrated as a criterion for the soundness of 
the knowledge claim. Thus, scientific reasoning is a spiral-like pursuit of combining different 
representations to establish new scientific objects, a process Rheinberger calls resonance (see 
also section 3). The concept of resonance has several meanings. I here clarify the concept 
with an analogy that serves to explain why matching of different representations in this 
context is not a mere addition of pieces of information from different models, but a matter of 
generating and superposing material traces and epistemic tools with different constraints.  
  
The concept of resonance in acoustics is defined as the tendency of a given system to 
oscillate with greater amplitude at some frequencies than at others. A sound will be 
prolonged if it is the result of a sympathetic vibration: a vibration in a body created as a 
response to a vibration of another body nearby with the same frequency as the ‘natural 
frequency’ of the body. At resonant frequencies the system will vibrate strongly compared to 
other frequencies. Knowledge production in science can be seen as analogous to the search 
for resonant frequencies. The materiality and different representational constraints put 
restrictions on what kind of representations can be made resonant. The difficult task is not 
only to compare representations, but to choose and produce representations that might have 
relevant constraints for shaping a new epistemic object. The scientist does not have the 
privilege of comparing his model to a “real”, completely independent object but must 
compare the model to other models and shuttle back and forth between different 
representations (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 98). These differences explain why knowledge 
generation is possible as a spiral-like co-production of scientific objects. In Rheinberger’s 
view, knowledge generation is thus a dynamic dialectic relation between the known and the 
unknown; between fact and artefact.  
In the following I shall give a concrete example of how the different constraints of 
models, e.g. mathematical and material constraints, set the boundary conditions for the 
possible questions to be asked and answered by the experimental system. Rheinberger’s 
terminology will be used in the discussion in section 3 in order to help with the difficult task 
of describing a process by which a new epistemic object comes into existence. This 
framework facilitates the recognition of how modeling can be understood as a loop between 
different representational spaces. However, Rheinberger does not offer a detailed account of 
how the specific constraints of different representational means can be used to evaluate the 
causal relationships and properties of the same object or process. Therefore, I shall in section 
3 expand on this framework and relate his work to recent accounts in philosophy of science. 
Here, I emphasize that different representational means constrain in different ways and how 
the failure of a complete match of representations can be understood in terms of a productive 
tension for learning about differences in the representational domains. This discussion will 
draw on the case examined in the following section where multiple models and engineering 
approaches are applied to facilitate the study of biological networks.  
 
 2: Reverse engineering biological networks 
In the wake of the new omics fields a large amount of data has become available for scientific 
analysis and provides a great potential for understanding the functional organization of living 
systems. However, the current approaches to realizing that potential still face many 
challenges such as i) the lack of sufficiently detailed data on dynamic processes with multiple 
variables, and ii) technical and theoretical tools to interpret and understand the data already 
available for analysis. A shift of perspective and the quantifiable tools of network theory have 
however offered unforeseen and promising possibilities for understanding functional 
organization in cells. Whereas many scientific achievements in molecular biology build on 
in-depth analyses of isolated components or pathways, the starting point for many projects in 
  
systems biology is to study the topology of network models using mathematical tools. Rather 
than focusing on a specific entity, the researchers abstract from the molecular details to focus 
on systems properties. This choice can be based on various considerations including 
tractability and what kind of analysis the details of the dataset allow. More important for the 
epistemic aim of this strategy is, however, that the overall structural and functional 
organization of the network can be investigated.  
General functional principles are often called organizing or design principles. The 
strategies of synthetic and systems biology reflect a hope that such features can be 
generalized across a wide variety of biological systems despite evolutionary contingencies. 
This research is often guided by the application of engineering principles. A key 
methodological framework called reverse engineering builds on an assumption of order in 
biological systems. The method starts by examining the solution - the existing structure or 
operation in living systems - and explores the function of this feature. The structures that 
appear in living systems are often tentatively assumed to represent (sub-)optimal solutions to 
environmental challenges. Reverse engineering is often employed in research projects with 
the aim of making sense of data from high-throughput analyses in e.g. transcriptomics and 
proteomics. In the current paper I exemplify this with the investigation of network motifs; 
possible design principles of biological networks defined by a group of systems biologists. 
The group is located at the Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel, with Uri Alon as the 
principal investigator. Alon is trained in physics and mathematics and joined the Department 
of Molecular Cell Biology at the Weizmann Institute in 1999 as a senior scientist. Alon’s 
group uses a combined experimental and theoretical approach to decompose biological 
networks into functional units. 
In reverse engineering biological networks, the systems biologists not only search for a 
function of a given structure; often the analysis begins by exploring the possibilities of 
relevant structures for a functional analysis of the network. For this reason Alon defines this 
type of reverse engineering as “mapping of an unknown network” (Alon, 2006, p. 239). 
Analogies from engineering can guide the search for order in biology by suggesting possible 
functional principles that are hypothesized to be similar within the two domains. A common 
analogy in both systems and synthetic biology compares cell circuits and electronic networks. 
Following the heuristic framework of this analogy, the group hypothesized that cells could be 
organized around small sub-circuits like electronic circuits built by engineers. This led them 
to believe that recurring circuit elements could be found that are analogous to general 
engineered designs like amplifiers and filters (Alon, 2006, and personal correspondence). The 
analogy had the advantage of focusing attention on a specific range of possibilities, namely 
small circuits within the network. Furthermore, the application of engineering terms also 
served as a rigid conceptual constraint for the formulation of possible biological functions 
regardless of the molecular details of the structures. However, the fact that engineering 
analogies are useful in the context of living systems is not obvious - while engineered 
systems are designed by an agent (a designer), biological systems evolve by a more complex 
process of evolutionary constraints where traits are highly interdependent. Therefore, the 
application of engineering principles has also met with critique (see section 3.1.). I return to 
this issue in section 3 but first I clarify how the engineering approaches were applied in this 
concrete project.  
  
 
2.1. Searching for design principles  
The aim of the group was to interpret data on transcriptional regulation in E. coli, available 
from the database RegulonDB and other sources. A now commonly used strategy is to picture 
the data as a computational network model that represents transcriptional interactions as a 
directed graph. Here, operons (one or several bacterial genes transcribed from the same 
mRNA) are represented as nodes, and regulatory transcriptional interactions are pictured as 
directed arrows, called edges. The group used this strategy to generate a network model that 
provided an overview of all the interactions (Alon, personal correspondence). In table 1 
below this is called the “Network model of biological data”. This is a graph where each edge 
is directed from an operon that encodes a transcription factor to another operon, representing 
the regulation of the target gene(s) by the transcription factor. The graph-theoretical 
framework provides a representational space where questions about the topology of the 
regulatory network can be asked without the need for molecular details. This makes it 
possible to model the overall interconnectivity of the network.  
Name of the model Basic features Experimental data Epistemic goal 
1) Network model based 
on biological data 
Visual representation of 
transcriptional 
interactions on genome 
level as a directed graph  
Overview of regulatory 
interactions represented 
as a network 
Data on transcriptional 
regulation from 
RegulonDB and literature 
study 
Basis for the search for 
recurring circuits in the 
network 
2) Scanning algorithm  
(mathematical model)  
A connectivity matrix to 
scan for recurring n-node 
sub-graphs  
Model 1, transcriptional 
interactions represented 
as a graph 
To find the most 
abundant n-node sub-
graphs 
3) Randomized network
A collection of 1000 
randomized networks 
(directed graphs) 
Markov-chain algorithms. 
One type was based on 
the randomization of 
model 1. Another was 
constructed from an 
empty matrix 
Type 1: data from model 
1 as a starting point.  
No experimental data in 
the second type 
To serve as background 
for comparison of 
networks 
4. Activation profile 
Mathematical model 
Graph displaying the 
input function, based on 
the structure of the 
network motif, using 
Boolean kinetics  
The previous models 
serve as basis for 
describing the structure 
and possible functional 
dynamics of each motif.      
A theoretical prediction 
of the functional 
dynamics of a network 
motif 
 
5. Transgenic E. coli 
Model organism  
Transgenic bacteria with 
fluorescent reporter 
plasmids controlled 
together with the 
promoters under study  
The GFP activity 
(expression of green 
fluorescent protein) 
represents the activity of 
the respective promoters 
 
 
To test the predictions of 
the temporal response 
time for systems 
controlled by different 
types of regulation 
Table 1 The basic features of the different models examined. The first three models served to suggest key 
functional units based on the statistical significance of recurring patterns. Model number 4 suggested the 
functional dynamics of the network motifs. Model number 5 served to bring the theoretical and material 
representations together.  
It has long been known that engineering principles such as feedback loops are common in 
biological systems. The analogy used by this group suggested a new analogue feature, 
namely that both electronic and biological networks could be decomposed into smaller 
  
circuits due to the reuse of the same small circuit designs with specific regulatory functions 
(Alon, 2003; 2007b). The assumption was that if such recurring circuits could be found, it 
would suggest specific regulatory principles that may have been preserved through evolution 
because of beneficial functions. As expected from the analogy, but nevertheless a surprising 
finding given the differences between the networks, a high quantity of recurring loops was 
found in the biological network. The group defined these as network motifs.  
Some of the motifs could be seen directly from the network model but to check for other 
important patterns, and to assure that the motifs were not just theoretical constructs, this 
representation had to be combined with other representations. For that purpose they 
compared the first model to a background model, consisting of corresponding networks for 
comparison but without the influences of natural selection (model 3, table 1). In order to 
establish a systematic automated search for network motifs, the group developed algorithms 
for automated pattern detection by scanning the network model for recurring 3, 4, and 5-node 
patterns (Shen-Orr et al. 2002). In table 1 this cluster of algorithms is referred to as the 
“scanning algorithm”. The algorithms provided a quantitative representation of the networks 
as a list of numbers of n-node sub graphs, and served as the basis for a statistical 
representation of the network topology. The group argued that differences between biological 
and randomized networks point to the preservation of certain structures by natural selection 
against mutations that randomly change edges in the networks (Milo et al. 2002; Mangan & 
Alon, 2002). The comparison of networks is illustrated in figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of networks. A “real” network here refers to the scientist’s terminology for the network 
based on biological data. The figure shows how one motif occurs much more often in the real than in the 
randomized networks (dotted lines). Source: Milo et al. 2002.  
 
  
The results of automated scans of both the network based on biological data and the 
randomized networks were compared in a statistical analysis and only statistically significant 
patterns were considered as network motifs. The result was that three motifs were statistically 
significant. These were defined as the Feedforward Loop (FFL), Single input module (SIM) 
motif and Dense Overlapping Regions (DOR) (see figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 illustrates network motifs found in the E. coli 
transcriptional network (a, c, e) with examples from 
empirical studies (b, d, f). a, Feedforward loops are 
three-node patterns with two transcription factors 
jointly regulating target operon(s). c, SIM motif, where 
a single transcription factor regulates several operons, e. 
DOR motif, where a set of operons (Zm) are regulated 
by a combination of different transcription factors (Xn). 
Source: Shen-Orr et al. (2002). 
In the following we shall concentrate on 
the FFL. This is a three-node loop where a 
gene Z is regulated by two transcription 
factors, X and Y (see figure 3a), and where X 
simultaneously controls both Z and Y. The 
FFL is one of the motifs that since the first 
study have been found in several different 
species and different networks (Alon, 2006). 
Of interest is not only what motifs are 
possible, but also what motifs never or rarely 
appear in biological networks. These are 
called anti-motifs. Following the 
representation of the FFL in figure 3, there are 
8 possible FFLs, since each of the arrows from 
transcription factor to operon can be either 
positive (activator) or negative (repressor). 
Four of those are called coherent FFLs, where 
the direct path from X to Z has the same 
overall sign (they both either activate or 
repress the transcription). In the other four, 
called incoherent FFLs, the direct path and the 
indirect path have opposing signs. Only two of 
these 8 possibilities are found in biological 
networks: a coherent FFL and an incoherent 
one (Alon, 2006).  
The scanning algorithm and the randomized networks showed that decomposition of the 
network into specific sub-modules was possible, and the statistically significant motifs 
matched the patterns seen directly in the network model. The quantitative significance 
pointed to a possible functional design of specific motifs, since some motifs are statistically 
  
significant and other motifs completely absent in biological networks (Shen-Orr et al, 2002). 
The next step was to investigate the functional difference between different motifs.  
 
2.3. Exploring the dynamics of network motifs  
To analyse the dynamics of the motifs, the group created a mathematical model, specific 
for each motif. This model displayed the regulation as a time-dependent response to different 
signal inputs, i.e. shifting concentrations of sugars in the environment of E. coli. When 
transcription factors bind to the promoter region of DNA they can either activate or repress 
the transcription of genes, and thereby increase or decrease protein synthesis. In a simplified 
description, transcription factors exist in an inactive (X) or active state (X*), according to the 
availability of a signal input, Sx. This signal input corresponds to the concentration of sugars 
available in the bacteria’s environment.  
The dynamics can be modelled as input functions of the motifs (see figure 4). An input 
function is a mathematical representation where the rate of production of a protein, Z, is a 
function of the activity of transcription factors. The concentration of the transcription factors 
is dependent on factors such as dilution, degradation etc. but most importantly on the 
concentration of the signal inputs, Sx and Sy, and the time-dependency of binding of 
promoters. These variables of multi-dimensional input functions can be idealized using 
Boolean kinetics. The result of the input function for the coherent FFL is shown in figure 4. 
FFLs can be regulated following an AND gate logic, where both transcription factors are 
needed simultaneously to activate Z, or an OR gate logic, where activation of only one 
transcription factor is needed. In the following I concentrate on the coherent FFL with AND 
gate logic. AND gate logic means that for the gene Z to be expressed, it needs to be activated 
by both transcription factors, X and Y, and they must in turn be activated by signal inputs (Sx 
and Sy respectively). With this graphical representation of the input function the researchers 
showed that the coherent FFL might function as a sign-sensitive delay element. The delayed 
response is due to the time difference between direct and indirect activation routes, and the 
requirement for the concentration of Y* to pass a certain threshold for persistent stimuli of 
both Sy and X* (via stimulation of persistent stimuli of Sx). Sign-sensitivity in this context 
means that the FFL can act as a persistence detector of stimuli where short pulses of Sx do not 
lead to activation of Z (see figure 4, time unit 3). This feature is however not displayed if Sx 
disappears (OFF-step pictured at time unit 15 on figure 4): if X* changes to its inactive state, 
the system rapidly shuts down and Z is not expressed. Thus, the proposed function of the 
activation profile is that the coherent FFL provides a sign-sensitive delay of gene expression 
as a response to ON steps but not to OFF-steps. In comparison the incoherent FFL has the 
opposite dynamic profile and shows a delay response to OFF-steps.  
  
 
Figure 4. Activation profile of the coherent FFL. Source: Shen-Orr et al. (2002). 
The activation profile represents only a possible biological function, since the constraints 
imposed on this analysis are primarily mathematical, involving idealizations such as the 
Boolean gate. Furthermore, the activation profile displays the function of motifs in isolation, 
whereas motifs in living organisms are embedded in hundreds of other interactions. Since 
these could strongly influence the function, it was not clear whether the dynamics predicted 
by the input function presented the function it displays in living organisms. The efforts of 
modeling therefore needed to be integrated with experiments that included material 
constraints of biological systems.  
2.4. Combining different representations 
To address the question of the function of FFLs in living cells, Alon’s group chose the L-
arabinose system in E. coli that was found to be regulated by the coherent FFL. This system 
was compared to another system with simple regulation, the lac operon (Mangan et al, 2003). 
The arabinose system encodes enzymes that utilize the sugar arabinose in the presence of 
arabinose and absence of glucose. The production of enzymes to digest arabinose is regulated 
according to the availability of sugars in the environment. In order to test the predictions of 
the model experimentally, the group measured the promoter activity for the two operons as a 
response to shifting concentrations of sugars in the controlled environment. Since promoter 
activities cannot be measured directly, the group incorporated reporter plasmids in which the 
ara and lac promoters also control a green fluorescent protein (gfp gene). The expression of 
green fluorescent protein (GFP activity) can be measured by automated multiwell 
fluorimeters. This measure indirectly represents the activity of the respective promoters 
because the fluorescent protein is expressed simultaneously with the ara/lac genes by the E. 
coli strains. The ara system was manipulated by controlled shifts in concentration of signal 
  
molecules, Sy=arabinose and Sx=cAMP (a molecule produced during glucose starvation). The 
predicted dynamic was tested by comparing curves for response time to ON and OFF-signals 
for the two systems. Despite the context of other interactions, the curves created from 
measurements of the feedforward regulated arabinose system closely matched the overall 
prediction of the C1-FFL as a sign-sensitive delay element (Mangan et al, 2003). The ON 
response of the FFL-controlled system was significantly slower than the simple regulation, 
whereas the OFF response in the two systems was almost identical.  
The network motifs are now a part of the basic terminology of systems biology, and the 
methodology developed by Alon’s group and colleagues has become a widely known 
framework for further experimentation, e.g. the search for these and other network motifs in 
different networks and different species. As a consequence Alon has argued for the 
productivity of why-questions in systems biology, i.e. of asking why a system has a specific 
structure or organization (Alon, 2006). He proposes that viewing nature not only as a tinkerer 
but also as analogous to an engineer throws light on design principles behind biological 
network architecture (Alon, 2003; 2007a; 2007b). It may even throw light on questions 
regarding ecology. The following section describes a theoretical cost-benefit analysis called 
inverse ecology proposed by Alon’s group. Section 3 discusses philosophical implications of 
the integration of methods from engineering and biology and combining multiple models.  
 
2.5. Inverse ecology and the evolution of motifs 
 
The discussion about the functional significance of different motifs has a dual nature. A 
central part of the analysis regards the function of motifs expressed in engineering terms, i.e. 
a function rigidly defined as a response to input signals depending on the structure of the 
motif in question (section 2.3.). The result of this analysis is a general function a network 
must have given the characteristics related to this type of motif (see also Levy & Bechtel, 
forthcoming). Another issue regards the possible adaptive values of motif-based functions in 
different types of environments. Here, the functions of network motifs are considered in 
relation to biological purposes of the control-mechanisms and the possible selective forces 
behind the origin of such design principles. When it is argued that the FFL must have been 
selected due to its function as a sign-sensitive delay element, it is implied that there exist 
strong fitness-related benefits connected to the responsiveness of transcriptional networks to 
changes in external stimuli. This assumption has been addressed by a comparison of different 
environmental characteristics.  
The experiments on the arabinose system led to the question of what types of 
environments could facilitate the selection of specific motifs. Since sufficient information on 
the natural environment of many organisms - including E. coli - is lacking, theoretical 
discussions can provide suggestions to guide the experimental investigations. Mangan et al. 
(2003) discuss the advantages of the FFL and ask under what environmental conditions the 
coherent FFL would be selected over simpler gene circuits. This issue was later addressed in 
theoretical cost-benefit analyses for the selection of network motifs in a given environment 
(Dekel & Alon, 2005; Dekel et al. 2005; Kashtan & Alon, 2006; Kalisky et al. 2007). 
Following the implication of regulation of specific motifs, a profile of the natural 
environment of the organisms can be made. This is a profile of the properties of the signal 
  
inputs (here the average duration of the signal in time) that would make each of the motifs 
beneficial for organisms in particular environments.  
The theoretical approach is connected to an analogy of economically optimized energy 
budgets for organisms. This can be illustrated by the arabinose system. Since glucose is the 
preferred energy source for bacteria, the arabinose system should, following this analogy, 
only be expressed when glucose is absent. The length of pulses of glucose is important here, 
since short pulses of the starvation signal cAMP would have a detrimental effect on growth if 
Z is unnecessarily produced as a response to a brief input pulse. As the modeling and 
experiment showed, the coherent FFL can filter out such short pulses. In addition, whenever 
glucose appears or arabinose disappears, it is beneficial to immediately shut down the 
arabinose system - a feature the FFL shares with the simple regulation. The result of the 
analysis was that the C1-FFL is selected over simple regulation in environments with multi-
modal pulses, where a persistence detector to filter out short input signals is beneficial. The 
assumption of an energy budget related to regulation by motifs thus suggests possible 
constraints on the environments in which the systems evolved. The cost-benefit provides a 
mathematically controlled comparison between different designs that can provide productive 
guesses about environmental features. The network motifs are here assumed to be 
instantiations of optimal circuit designs, representing an internal model of the environment in 
which they were selected. The group defined this method of deducing information about the 
environment from the motifs detected as inverse ecology (Dekel et al. 2005). This 
terminology has caught on as the concept ‘reverse ecology’ which now covers the use of 
information from genomics to gain knowledge about ecological interactions (e.g. Borenstein 
et al. 2008). 
As we have seen, the notion of general design principles can guide the development of 
new hypotheses and methodological approaches in biology. However, the heuristics of 
optimal design in biology has also led to a discussion on the limitations of engineering 
principles in biology (e.g. Lynch, 2007). In the following this issue will be addressed. I first 
introduce a dual notion of constraints and show how this can be used to throw light on the 
attempt of applying engineering principles to the study of living systems, and to the 
interlocking use of multiple models.  
3. Constraining new epistemic entities 
In section 2 I have described how network motifs emerged as new epistemic entities 
from the combination of different modeling strategies and through the integration of 
methodologies from engineering and biology. In the following I emphasize the importance of 
different constraints for creating new spaces of representations. That different representations 
are differently constrained is implicit in Rheinberger’s definition and description of 
experimental systems, but the issue has recently been more explicitly addressed and 
contextualized by other philosophers of science (e.g. Nersessian, 2002a; 2002b; Knuuttila, 
2011). A focus on constraints helps to understand how scientific reasoning is guided by a 
productive tension between enabling and disabling constraints. Only a selection of 
possibilities is considered when formulating and addressing a scientific problem in terms of 
selected representational tools, and this may limit the reasoning by neglecting some issues in 
  
favor of others. However, this is at the same time what makes it possible to pick out relevant 
epistemic units for analysis. The combination of epistemic means with different constraints 
provides access to new spaces of representation unavailable without these constraints.2 A 
better understanding of the micro-dynamics of knowledge-generation can be reached by 
analyzing the characteristic constraints of the different types of representations the modeler 
must combine. I first examine how the integration of multiple models and methodologies 
from engineering and biology can be understood. I then compare Rheinberger’s framework to 
recent philosophical accounts addressing similar issues. I argue that these together provide an 
adequate view on knowledge generation through a convergent spiral-like process. 
3.1. Biology meets engineering 
In the case study examined an engineering analogy was employed to suggest possible 
principles of order in biological systems. What provides the optimism that engineered and 
biological networks could be similar? One possibility is that the functional similarities 
between the systems are stable enough to make analogy transfer productive in both domains, 
because both engineered devices and biological systems are constantly evaluated for their 
ability to respond to changing parameters inside and outside the system. This may explain 
why conceptualization of biological networks in terms of control theory can open a new 
epistemic space for understanding biological function, just like solutions in organisms have 
inspired engineers to develop and improve their designs. In the following I shall argue that 
the actual mapping of similarities is only one part of the story, but first I shall reflect on the 
discussion regarding similarities and dissimilarities.  
The transfer of epistemic units across these domains is guided by different types of 
analogies. Material analogies can provide a basis for constructing formal analogies that in 
turn may guide the production of hypotheses about causal relations (Hesse, 2001; Nersessian, 
2002a; Knuuttila & Loettgers, forthcoming). For Alon the analogy between biological 
networks and electronic circuits gave rise to the formal analogy of the graph theoretical 
framework described. This framework provides enabling constraints for analyzing biological 
networks with the use of mathematical models such as algorithms that scan the network for 
recurring subunits. Thus, the use of engineering principles affords a conceptualization of 
biological functions in language from control- and graph theory. Engineering terms introduce 
a more rigid functional language which, unlike a purely qualitative analysis, can be 
operationalized mathematically.3 When network motifs are described through concepts like 
persistence detectors, pulse amplifiers, circuits, bi-stability etc. the functional descriptions 
can often be given a graphical and quantitative representation that can sharpen the predictive 
value of functional analysis.   
The search for design principles is an attempt to find simple and general principles of 
order within the domain of biological complexity. Recent findings in systems and synthetic 
biology give some optimism that such principles could be found by tentatively viewing the 
“tinkerer” (nature) as an engineer (Alon 2003; 2007b). However, engineering approaches 
                                                            
2 A similar argument has been advanced by Knuuttila and Loettgers (Knuuttila, 2011; Knuuttila and Loettgers, 
2012). 
3 I would like to thank Pierre-Alain Braillard for pointing this out to me.  
  
clearly have their limitations for analyzing the origin of structures. Behind the expectation of 
optimality in biological networks is often a (working) assumption of convergent evolution 
where natural selection is imagined to have improved the functionality of specific traits. In 
the case of network models problematic aspects are i) the problem of individuating network 
motifs as individual traits, and ii) general network construction processes that might point to 
the status of network motifs as by-products (or spandrels) rather than optimized design 
principles (Solé & Valverde, 2006). Lynch has argued that the application of engineering 
principles in biology tends to bring in an unwanted notion of design, if not directly through 
adaptationist assumptions about convergent evolution, then of purpose-laden engineering 
terms such as amplifiers, filters and sign-sensitive delays as we have seen in this case (e.g. 
Lynch, 2007). The assumption of convergent evolution has been challenged by recent work 
arguing for the possibility that structures such as the FFL could have evolved neutrally 
through processes of duplication, mutation, deletion and recombination of genes and binding 
cites (Cordero & Hogeweg, 2007; Knabe et al. 2008). Thus, design analogies may provide a 
disabling constraint when it comes to the study of the origin of biological structures, since 
design analogies can lead to a neglect of non-selective forces.  
The question is now whether this problem leaves the integration of engineering principles 
unproductive? Are there scopes of representation that should not be combined because they 
tend to be misleading? In the following section I shall argue for the productivity of the 
matching of representations despite the lack of overlapping constraints. However, a stronger 
focus on the tensions in the constraints of e.g. engineering approaches and mathematical 
embedding in biology not only introduces insights into how these integrative efforts are 
productive but also a greater awareness of their limitation. 
Rheinberger states that experimental systems operate “at the border of their breakdown” 
(Rheinberger, 1997, p. 135). This means that the integrative tendency of experimental 
systems involves a degree of instability where unpredictable results may occur. In this 
framework the resistance to the matching of representations is not seen as counterproductive 
to the goal of establishing resonant links, but as a dialectical resistance that makes the 
realization of new epistemic things possible: “The reality of epistemic things lies in their 
resistance” (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 23). Similarly, the resistance to the application of 
engineering principles can be interpreted as a sign of biological specificity of the epistemic 
thing under analysis. Knuuttila and Loettgers (this volume) give an excellent example of this. 
When the engineering concept of controllability is transferred to the study of biological 
systems, the unforeseen differences between the systems provide insights into the functional 
role of noise for attaining robust biological functioning. A similar example can be drawn 
from the current debate on network motifs and the discussion of whether network motifs can 
be functionally isolated in other living organisms than E. coli. It has been questioned whether 
network motifs like the FFL have a general biological function, like the one described in 
section 2.4., because network motifs are embedded in many other interactions in living 
systems (Mazurie et al. 2005). Further experimental evidence is needed to settle this issue, 
but it is possible to discuss what consequences a possible negative result would have for the 
view on engineering approaches. One possibility is that the result can be interpreted as a 
shortcoming of the engineering approach in biology – a failed attempt to establish general 
design principles that have similar functions despite evolutionary contingencies. However, 
  
the negative analogy can also be seen as a productive dialectical resistance that helps to 
generate knowledge about what is specific for biological and engineered systems, 
respectively. This might provide insights into how the transcriptional networks of prokaryotes 
and eukaryotes differ. Alon himself finds it likely that more complex cases will be found 
where the function of motifs to a greater extent is affected by other interactions in the 
network (Alon, 2007a). Thus, the negative analogy can condition the generation of  
knowledge when the attempt of transferring epistemic units meets resistance.  
The usefulness of engineering principles in biology cannot be foreseen, but neither would 
it be a complete coincidence; it depends on an open structure of the investigative process and 
on properties that resonate when compared on an abstract level. Rheinberger uses the term 
conjecture to describe the emergence of a new constellation that opens the way for what he 
calls unprecedented events. He prefers the term conjecture rather than ‘discovery’, since 
scientific objects never present themselves as readymade facts. Conjectures are not possible 
to predict, but at the same time they are not events happening by accident. The events that 
create conjectures he calls hybridizations of different, originally independent systems 
(Rheinberger, 1997, p. 135). A similar notion is integration that is increasingly discussed in 
philosophy of science (cf. O’Malley & Soyer, 2012). In both accounts the integrative effort 
implies that something new is generated when e.g. engineering and biology meet that extends 
the application of stable knowledge to a new context.  
The openness may, however, change during a research project. The initial work on 
network motifs can be described as data-driven modeling, where possibilities were explored 
based on the engineering analogy described. Compared to the later model-driven 
experimentation, guided by a well-defined hypothesis, this initial research was highly 
exploratory. Rheinberger’s approach offers an insightful description of the workings of 
experimental systems, but he does not offer conceptual tools to distinguish between such 
different modes of research. A finer grained framework is proposed by recent accounts 
discussing a distinction between hypothesis-driven research and ‘exploratory 
experimentation’ (e.g. Steinle, 1997; O’Malley, 2007; O’Malley & Soyer, 2012). Such a 
distinction is especially relevant for describing new developments within the life sciences 
where automated hypothesis-generation from data is currently a hot topic of debate. 
Rheinberger does, however, address different degrees of openness through a distinction 
between different degrees of representational strength in science. This distinction is useful for 
understanding how the network motifs gained stability from the exploratory investigation of 
networks to an experimental demonstration of predicted functions of network motifs. This 
issue will be discussed in the following section.  
 
3.2. Epistemic objects at the intersection of constraints 
 During the effort to interpret, by modeling, transcriptional regulatory networks, the 
network motifs developed from being a concept derived from a loosely applicable 
engineering analogy to become a biological concept widely known in systems and synthetic 
biology. How can this transformation be understood? In the following I shall argue that the 
interlocking use of the different models (table 1) provided the network motifs with an 
increased representational strength. Rheinberger distinguishes between three types of model-
  
based representation with correspondingly different degrees of representational strength. The 
first is representation as an analogy where the objects or systems represented are intentionally 
related by different kinds of similarities. The second is representation in the form of models 
or simulations, and the third is representation as an experimental realization. The strength of 
representation differs correspondingly from “a continuum from vicarship to embodiment to 
realization” (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 103). In other words, there is a transformation from 
representations as to representation of, and to a realization where the represented transforms 
into a stable object.4 The choice of the concept “vicarship” has caused some confusion, and 
Rheinberger does not sufficiently clarify the meaning of this term. I interpret this type of a 
representation as an analogue substitute, such as a material analogy like the hormonal system 
represented as a thermostat. In the following I shall expand on these notions to describe how 
the constraints of different models in the case examined transformed the status of the new 
epistemic thing, the network motifs. The models described (table 1) are connected through a 
series of common assumptions and intentions with their design and are thus not independent. 
However, as I shall show in the section below, what is important is that they embody 
different types of representational means that have different constraints.  
In the case study examined, the analogy between electronic circuits and biological 
networks served as an analogue substitute. The creation of the network model of the dataset 
transferred the transcriptional interactions to a new representational space that afforded both a 
visual pattern-recognition and an automated scan for recurring subunits. As described in 
section 3.1., analogies should not only be considered productive for fixing shared features 
between two domains but have a productive role as tentative and unstable assumptions (see 
also Knuuttila & Loettgers, forthcoming). The analogy constrained this analysis, since only 
small subunits – similar to those of electronic circuits – were scanned for. In the first study 
three different patterns were classified as network motifs due to their statistical significance. 
The mathematical constraints of the scanning algorithm and the statistical comparison 
provided support to the overabundant patterns seen by eye by automated pattern recognition. 
The recent critique of the method employed can be interpreted as a criticism of the lack of 
evolutionary constraints in this comparison, since the background randomization in the 
models for comparison does not resemble the evolution of biological networks (see section 
3.1.). However, because of, rather than despite of, this false assumption, structures were 
found that are general for many networks. This is an important insight even if the 
functionality turns out to be different in different networks, and even if the network motifs 
are not results of convergent evolution. The function analysed using input functions may even 
be especially informative because it lacks the biological constraints of other interactions and 
only provides information about motifs in isolation. This analysis can thus provide the basis 
for the next step, where knowledge about biological contexts may be gained from the 
deviation from this function. For the experimental realization of network motifs as biological 
                                                            
4 The distinction as it is used here is not a matter of the accuracy of representation of a real world target, since 
models never directly represent and often depict hypothetical and fictional systems. The distinction refers to the 
way the target is represented and how stable this historical relation is – whether this takes the form of a loosely 
applicable analogy, as embodiment of a property, or as the realization of new knowledge. In the latter case the 
model may lose its role as a model and become a more direct representation of our understanding of the target. 
  
organizing principles it was, however, important that the same function could be 
experimentally demonstrated. How did the researchers arrive at this stage? 
During the analysis of the functional role of the motifs the strength of representation of 
the models shifted from being an analogue substitute - a treatment of biological networks as 
if they were analogous to an engineered network – to a more substantial embodiment of 
(biological) research questions regarding the functionality of the motifs. The activation 
profile thus embodies a motif’s function. But since the constraints imposed on this analysis 
are primarily mathematical, the function was not realised in a biological context. In this 
example the target of the transcriptional regulation was treated as a Boolean gate with the 
number 0 or 1, denoting that the genes are always either off or maximally on. This 
idealization is a reduction of the complexity found in living systems since this is usually a 
graded response. However, the epistemic goal of using this model was not to have an 
accurate representation based on precise values of parameters. Rather the aim was to create 
an idealized epistemic space where the functional significance of different motifs could be 
analysed. This comparative mathematical analysis allows for a quantification of biological 
functions where the difference between e.g. coherent and incoherent FFLs can be given a 
precise measure and thus has predictive value for the following experimental designs. The 
important relation was foremost how the mathematical constraints of the model of one motif 
differ from that of another motif. Accurate representation was thus secondary to imposing 
simple logic models that provide mathematical constraints for limiting the number of possible 
functions of the network motifs.  
As mentioned, the mathematical model displays the function of motifs in isolation, 
whereas motifs in living organisms are embedded in hundreds of other interactions that could 
influence the regulatory mechanism. Therefore, the efforts of modeling needed to be 
integrated with experiments that included material constraints of biological systems. In 
understanding this step toward an experimental realization, the material resistance of 
biological phenomena is important. It provides a challenge to purely theoretical forms of 
coherence, and the coupling of in vivo and in vitro approaches is thus crucial for creating 
strong resonant links between theoretically and materially constrained representations 
(Rheinberger, 1997; Knuuttila & Loettgers, 2011). The material constraints of model 
organisms explain why they often have a special epistemic status. Because they are made of 
the “same stuff” as the target object, including the same internal composition and functional 
organization, they provide productive, rigid constraints for the shaping of an epistemic 
object.5  
The effort of combining mathematical predictions with experimental manipulations was 
crucial for establishing a link between the (highly idealized) mathematical representation and 
the biological phenomena. The crucial step here is the re-presentation of the epistemic entity 
in other contexts with different constraints. In this sense there is an iterative loop of 
reinserting and reproducing the emerging stable features into new experimental contexts. The 
experiment provided information on e.g. the specific concentrations of input signals required 
for activation of transcription factors. This made it possible to create a more exact dynamic 
                                                            
5 In addition to this they have a special status as representatives of the whole organism and a broad 
representational scope of similar organisms (Ankeny & Leonelli, 2011). For an insightful analysis of the 
similarities and differences between modeling and experimentation, see Knuuttila & Loettgers (2012). 
  
model for the specific regulatory system, and the experimental result can in this sense be said 
to provide feedback to the theoretical model in an iterative cycle. However, this experiment 
confirmed that the overall dynamic features do not depend on the details of the parameters in 
the input function. This gave some optimism that possible organizing principles can be 
investigated using a simple activation profile without the requirement of detailed information 
on parameter values of the specific systems they are found in. Once this method was 
developed, it was repeated with different motifs and different datasets to further stabilize the 
concept of network motif. This part of the research can be described as highly hypothesis-
driven, and the fact that the network motifs were found in a variety of different organisms 
and in different networks (see Alon, 2006) further supported the experimental realization of 
the new epistemic entity. Due to the recent critique, network motifs can, however, still be 
considered as question-generating machines – as partly stable epistemic entities that produce 
new questions for further experimental analysis (Mazurie et al. 2005; Knabe et al, 2008).   
To conclude I want to emphasize a strong parallel between Rheinberger’s account and 
existing accounts of modeling within philosophy of science. Rheinberger’s notion of 
resonance has strong similarities with what Levins and Wimsatt call robustness, allied to 
Campbell’s notion of triangulation (see Wimsatt, 2007). Knuuttila and Loettgers draw on this 
framework in an integrated account of modeling where scientific reasoning builds on the 
triangulation of different epistemic means, including synthetic modeling and experimentation 
(2011; 2012, and this volume). Whereas Rheinberger has stressed the productive tension 
between the known and the unknown, or the dialectic between fact and artefact, Knuuttila and 
Loettgers stress a similar dialectic of constraints where it is the “relatedness and 
independence that gives combinatorial modeling its epistemic leverage leading to iterative 
cycles of modeling” (Knuuttila & Loettgers, this volume). In both frameworks there is an 
emphasis on the cyclic nature of knowledge generation through iterativity or resonance of 
different epistemic means. Rheinberger provides a series of interrelated categories for 
conceptualising transformations in science that are difficult to intellectualize because they 
concern something pre-theoretic; the generation of knowledge about what is not yet known. 
With the notion of the irreducibly vague concept of epistemic objects it is possible to speak of 
an object of study that is still in the process of becoming a scientific entity. Rheinberger does 
not, however, explicitly address the issue of how specific constraints are triangulated in the 
process of resonance. For this reason, I have added a dual notion of constraints of engineering 
principles applied to biology and of the models employed in the case study.  
  
Conclusion  
I have examined a case study in systems biology where engineering principles were applied 
to a biological network investigated by multiple models. Drawing on Rheinberger’s 
terminology, I have argued that integrative activities provide a potential for understanding 
how new knowledge is gained from only partly stable constellations of multiple models and 
representational spaces brought together. On one hand, experimental systems must be 
sufficiently stable and constrained to allow for the comparison and reproduction of epistemic 
units. On the other hand, they must be unstable enough to allow for unpredictable results. I 
  
have shown how the combination of mathematical and biological constraints in the modeling 
process was crucial in the case examined where network motifs emerged as new epistemic 
objects in systems biology. The specific properties of productive constraints for generating 
knowledge is, however, often only clear in retrospect. At the time when research is carried 
out, knowledge has to be gained not only of how well the different constraints fit the yet 
unknown constraints of the emerging epistemic object, but also about the specificity of the 
representational spaces brought together. It is in this sense that models can be described as 
only partly stable because they embody a share of what is not yet known. This tension 
between stability and instability and between different types of constraints explains what 
makes experimental systems and the models within them productive. A better understanding 
of how specific constraints are triangulated thus provides insights into how modeling is not a 
matter of accurately representing targets but of generating, manipulating and superposing 
different epistemic tools to learn about what is not yet known.  
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